

Conflict Transformation and a Culture of Peace in the Arab Countries

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This brief paper is offered as background material for an exploratory two-day workshop on *Conflict Resolution and a Culture of Peace in the Arab World*, to be hosted by the Bibliotheca Alexandrina as part of its Arab Reform Forum, on 13 and 14 September, 2006.

This year, after the recent fighting in Lebanon, we have already seen seven wars involving at least one Arab country (in Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, Palestine, and at a milder level, in Yemen and Saudi Arabia) –compared to an average of 5.5 each year since 1946, and a peak of 10 in the late 1980’s– ensuring that the Arab region remains one of the most war-prone regions in the world¹.

On the global level, our data show that after increasing steadily from the mid-1950’s to the early 90’s, number of wars and levels of war intensity have dropped by over 60% in the last 15 years². There have been even greater drops over the same period in the Arab region, but levels of violence in the region still remain more than twice as high per capita than in Muslim-minority states or non-Muslim non-Western states, with other Muslim-majority states in between³.

¹ See data analysis by the Center for Systemic Peace, at <http://members.aol.com/CSPmngm/>.

² See Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self Determination Movements and Democracy*. College Park MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005 (www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict.asp).

³ Monty Marshall *Measuring Systemic Peace*, 2006 (see especially the note to figure 10): <http://members.aol.com/CSPmngm/conflict.htm>. Further analysis comparing Arab with other Muslim majority

What are the dynamics driving this violence, and what is being done or can be done to alleviate it and move the region toward a sustainable culture of peace?

Risk Factors

Extensive research on the dynamics of societal conflicts over the last 60 years have allowed us to develop models that predict with about 80% certainty which states and which minority groups will be facing new wars in the next few years. Those factors found to be good predictors may be divided into four areas⁴:

- 1- Group *incentives* for collective action to challenge the status quo;
- 2- Salience of the *separate group identity* of the challengers;
- 3- Group *capacity* for collective action; and
- 4- Intra- and international *opportunity* factors for collective action.

Risk factors in the first category (*incentives*) reflect sustained threats to basic human needs, which motivate

countries shows more wars involving the former, despite a much smaller population. Western countries have comparatively few wars and so are not included in this comparison.

⁴ Ted Robert Gurr and John Davies “Dynamics and Management of Ethnopolitical Conflicts” in John Davies and Edward Kaufman *Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation*. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. See also <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/>; and John Davies and Ted Robert Gurr *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

strong actions to challenge the status quo. Key factors include lost autonomy (threats to need for recognition, respect): e.g., Palestinians or Lebanese under Israeli occupation and blockade, Sunnis in Iraq, non-Arabs in Darfur, Iraqis who see themselves under Western occupation. Other key factors of this type include government repression (especially if accompanied by high infant mortality rate), and increasing political or economic restrictions (threats to needs for human security, social justice, effective participation): e.g., Palestinians under Israeli occupation, non-Arabs in Darfur, militant puritans in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, other Arabs living under emergency measures.

The second type of risk factor exacerbates the sense of *separate identity* from those dominating the status quo, as needed for mobilization, for example through persistent protest over 10 years, economic, political or cultural discrimination, and intensity of past conflicts: e.g., Arab-Israeli relations, Arab-Western relations, Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds in Iraq, Somali clans.

The third type refers to *capacity* for collective action, including territorial concentration, availability of arms and communications technology, or cohesive group organization with reduced support for conventional groups or cross-cutting organizations. An example of the latter is selective funding and support of intolerant, puritan groups and ideologies, with no support for training in diverse moderate traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia, and early support for Hamas over Fatah by

Israel, followed by more recent refusal to deal with moderate Fatah leaders.

The fourth type of factor refers to *opportunities* for collective action. They include autocratic (uniquely relevant in the Arab region)⁵ or mixed (i.e., partly democratic) political systems; and weak (e.g., Palestine, Somalia, Yemen), transitional (e.g., Lebanon), oppressive (e.g., Somalia before the war), isolated or dependent states (e.g., dependent on foreign aid as in Palestine, or on trade in a single commodity such as oil, as in Iraq and Saudi Arabia). Other factors of this type are demographic stress (e.g., Gaza); politically unstable neighbors (e.g., southern Sudan); weak regional organizations exerting little moderating influence on members; and failure to attract the kind of broad-based international economic investment that fosters rule of law and benefits the larger population (as opposed to elite-dominated single-commodity trade as above which increases the gap between rich and poor).

Since the end of the cold war, incentive factors and some key opportunity factors for war (autocratic and dependent client states, unstable neighbors) have waned globally, along with military aid budgets, allowing sustained peacemaking efforts and stronger support for democratic reform to bear fruit in an unprecedented number of negotiated settlements⁶. This has in turn led to a

⁵ Our Polity IV project rates each state yearly on a 20-point scale from highly autocratic to highly democratic: see www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/. See discussion below on uniqueness of Arab region.

⁶ Marshall and Gurr, 2005 (see footnote 2 page 4).

broad-based decline in wars globally, including the Lebanon civil war, and a consolidation of the shift from a predominance of autocratic states (almost three times as many autocratic compared to democratic states in the mid-70's) to an unprecedented predominance of democratic states (where the ratio is now reversed), with the durability of new democratic states increasing.

However, in the Arab region, and more recently in Central Asia, two factors – first, the continuing concern among major oil-consuming states to protect oil markets from the instabilities usually associated with democratic transitions, especially where popular opposition groups have become militant and cynical regarding democratic process; and second, the capacity of several autocratic states to maintain their strength through massive oil revenues rather than reforms, has led to international collusion in the entrenchment of autocratic rule in the region that marks it as unique in the contemporary world. Especially over the last year, the pullback of US and Western support for democratic reform in the face of electoral gains by Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, all listed as terrorist organizations by the US, has contributed to disillusionment and a loss of hope for democratic reforms in the region, that only feeds militancy. This is a high risk environment, as reflected in the still high levels of violence in the region. What are our options for alleviating this situation?

Alleviating Violence – Power-Based Approach

Broadly speaking, approaches to alleviating violence may be divided into four distinct categories: *power-based*, *rights-based*, *needs-based* and *unity-based*⁷. Each of these represents a distinct way of understanding the world, a different paradigm of social reasoning easily recognizable across cultures. Understood as complementary resources, they provide a strong basis for sustainable peace; but if used in isolation, or taken to be mutually exclusive, they can serve to perpetuate social tension and division.

Of these four, the first (*power-based*) approach emphasizes security needs, and the effort to impose control or retributive justice on anyone who might use, or seems to have used, unauthorized violence. This has been the simple logic for the “war on terror,” for example, as well as the invasion of Iraq, vengeful sectarian militias in Iraq, and various forms of autocratic governance in the region. Relevant cultural norms include those which emphasize obedience and deference to those of higher rank, and which accept bribery as a normal exercise of economic power.

There can be no lasting culture of peace, however, unless it is recognized that not only direct violence must be alleviated, but equally, that hidden, indirect or structural violence is also alleviated. Indirect violence is where injustice is perpetuated through fear, or through preventing access to good education, free inquiry and

⁷ John Davies “Power, Rights, Interests and Identity: Conflict Management Strategies for Building a Democratic Peace” in Davies and Kaufman, 2003 (see footnote 4 page 5).

debate, job opportunities, legal defense etc. Sustainable peace requires a broadly shared sense of justice, and for justice to have any meaning, there must be compassion for human needs and freedom from oppression. Primary reliance on hard power to suppress violence soon leads to perceptions of structural violence (social injustice), exacerbating security, respect and justice needs and motivating new challenges to the legitimacy of government. Our experience has been that a lasting consensus on peace can only be built on the basis that peace and justice are inseparable.

The power-based approach on its own becomes particularly problematic in complex, mobile and rapidly changing societies with diverse sources of information, ideas, legitimacy, power (economic and social as well as political and military) and leadership. In the absence of a normative consensus on the limits of power, power is vulnerable to abuse, where even those who hold or explore non-violent perspectives or goals at odds with those favored by the elite can be labeled as potential terrorists, apostates or traitors and brutally oppressed. Militant puritans, for example, or sectarian militias, claiming the right to constrain or kill those who disagree with their ideas, despite sanctions against such behavior in religious texts and law, may take on this role with the support or tolerance of the state. Hence in the current global context, autocratic governance is itself a strong risk factor for civil war, and rarely succeeds in creating a sustainable culture of peace. The *realpolitik* emphasis on power during the cold war, for example, led to a steady expansion in the number and intensity of protracted wars, reaching at its

peak (mid 70's – mid-90's) a level of violence comparable to (or in terms of civilian deaths, worse than) the two world wars⁸.

Rights-Based Approach

The second (*rights-based*) approach emphasizes the needs for social justice and effective participation, through processes for finding and clarifying a normative cultural consensus on what is right and wrong behavior, particularly for managing conflicts. Such cultural norms, and more formal laws that are passed consistent with them, provide a framework to hold even elites accountable for their exercise of power under the principle of rule of law. In this more complex, principled form of social reasoning, legitimacy of government depends on honoring the norms more than on holding sources of power. National identity and sense of security are anchored more in the shared norms than in any common ruler, patron or protector.

Under the principle of rule of law, democratic systems allow a broadly consultative and inclusive approach to governance, distributing responsibility for decision making – including decisions on who will make, execute or adjudicate different types of decision – so that all are to some extent empowered to participate in governance processes which address or impact their interests. Laws and structures of governance are developed with the goal of minimizing resort to violence (whether direct or structural) in managing internal conflict.

⁸ Monty Marshall *Third World War: System, Process and Conflict Dynamics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.

There is also much variability among democratic forms across cultures, each drawing on the strengths and unique experiences of its own history and culture to develop a broad national consensus on appropriate norms, institutions and divisions of responsibility. Lebanon, for example, distributes power among confessional groups; the US emphasizes federalism and a bill of rights; while France ignores sectarian distinctions and minimizes provincial powers.

A basic characteristic of democracy that holds true across cultures, is that it is associated with minimal risks of both violent societal conflict and structural violence (oppression). Our data indicate that autocracies, lacking the institutional safeguards to prevent oppression, are now two and a half times more likely than democracies to experience new outbreaks of societal (internal) war⁹. Most of this democratic protection from violence may be attributed to democratic norms (democratic culture) as compared to legal/institutional constraints on exercise of power, though the latter are also a significant factor¹⁰. The capacity of democracies to minimize internal violence (as well as external violence among democratic states) explains much of the global drop in violence over the last

⁹ Comparing states in the highest and lowest quartiles as rated annually on the 20-point Polity scale. See Marshall and Gurr, 2005, footnote 2 above. Polity IV data and resources are maintained by our center and may be accessed online at www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.

¹⁰ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993) pp. 624-638.

15 years, given the wave of new democracies at the end of the cold war.

However, there are significant limits on capacity to achieve sustainable peace using a rights-based approach. Most attempts at democratic transition over the last 60 years have failed within the first ten years, leading to societal war and/or back to autocracy¹¹. Although democracies are two and a half times *less* likely to experience new violent societal conflict than autocracies, transitional democracies (states in the two middle quartiles on the 20-point Polity scale) are two and a half times *more* likely to experience such conflicts than autocracies – six times more at risk than democracies¹².

Some have argued that it makes sense to introduce radical reform, moving from autocracy to institutional democracy in one step, thus avoiding the high-risk, no man's land of transitional democracy. The problem is that while this may work in a state that has previously had a democratic culture and institutions within the memory of the current generation (e.g., Hungary, Czech Republic), it rarely works in other states (e.g., Russia, Azerbaijan). Democratic institutions may be established by decree, but to the extent they are not supported by the norms of a democratic culture, they are easily undermined.

¹¹ See Marshall and Gurr, 2005, footnote 2 above. In recent years, Marshall and Gurr note, this failure rate has begun to moderate, probably reflecting higher levels of international support for new democracies.

¹² See Marshall and Gurr, 2005, footnote 2 page 4.

Attempts to impose democracy by force also tend to fail, in part for the same reason, as we are seeing now in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of the 67 new democracies since 1950 that have been sustained, only six (8.5%) emerged as part of a settlement of a societal war (e.g., Nicaragua, South Africa – the latter having had long experience with democratic norms within the minority white population)¹³. War has an added disadvantage: not only does it severely limit opportunities for developing democratic norms, but it also provides both experience and vivid models for autocratic rule, effectively contradicting the stated goals of freedom from oppression and preventing their realization.

Even spending billions of dollars in an effort to promote both development and democracy in Iraq (and Afghanistan) has not allowed the US to escape this logic. And even with all the vital social services provided by Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Palestine, it will be very difficult for them to turn their current popularity into sustainable peace or democratic freedom if they continue to emphasize power-based strategies. With civilians making up about 85% of deaths in these wars,¹⁴ it will be extremely difficult for any of these “freedom fighters,” or those that respond to their provocations by escalating the violence, to regain and hold the high moral ground or provide the models needed for a culture of peace to emerge. The ideal of the democratic revolution or war of liberation is for the most part a dangerous mythology,

¹³ See Marshall and Gurr, 2005, footnote 2 page 4.

¹⁴ Harris and Reilly *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998.

typically leading only to more suffering and autocracy in different clothing.

The Arab world is now rated as the least democratic region in the world, with limited experience of democratic norms and institutions within the memory of the current generation,¹⁵ widespread abuse of human and civil rights¹⁶ and more than its share of wars of liberation¹⁷. This democratic deficit appears to have little to do with Islamic culture as such. Much of the non-Arab Islamic world now lives within democratic states, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Bangladesh, Senegal, Mali, Albania, Bosnia, India and periodically, Pakistan; and there is strong support for democratic governance, for example in such traditional Islamic norms as *shurah* and *ijma* (consultation and consensus), and in the frequent Qur'anic injunctions against submitting to oppression, with war and violence allowed only as a last resort (and then only within clear ethical limits), as exemplified in the life of the Prophet, pbuh.

Rather, our data point to economic dependence on single commodities (such as oil, diamonds or poppies) as a key risk factor in this region not only for violence (as discussed above), but also for democracy. The least

¹⁵ See Polity data, footnote 5 page 7.

¹⁶ For example, of the eight states rated “worst of the worst” for their human rights records in 2005, four were Arab (Libya, Syria, Sudan and Saudi Arabia) – see *Freedom in the World, 2005* (www.freedomhouse.org).

¹⁷ A list of wars since 1946 is maintained by the Center for Systemic Peace - <http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/warlist.htm>.

democratic Muslim majority states in the Middle East and Central Asian region (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAR, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan all score -7 to -10 on the Polity scale), almost uniformly correspond to the single-commodity states. Where international investors (such as oil companies, drug rings and/or consuming states) in effect collude with a small political and/or economic elites in ways that do not clearly benefit the larger population, levels of frustration and direct and structural violence also tend to be high¹⁸.

Western economies dependent on oil from the Middle East since the colonial era, and from Central Asia more recently, have been too concerned to maintain a steady flow of oil – and also to retain support from Arab and Muslim governments in the recent ‘war on terror’ – to provide sustained support for indigenous democratic reform efforts in the region. Nor have they insisted that oil or gas profits be invested in ways that benefit the mass of the people, intensifying resentment among the poor in countries like Iraq, and now Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

These failures, along with ill-advised efforts to promote democracy through military action, feed popular cynicism toward the West and its norms and forms of government. This can be exploited by autocratic regimes looking for a scapegoat to deflect economic and political frustrations among their people, allowing them to

¹⁸ Gurr and Davies, 2003, footnote 4 page 5.

neutralize popular pressure for democratic reforms. At the same time it generates broad support for militant groups embracing reactively violent and puritanical interpretations of Islam antithetical to democratic values, further eroding support for reforms but creating new risks of societal violence. Such cycles of violence may be impossible to avoid and very slow to resolve within the framework of the power-based and rights-based approaches.

Needs-Based Approach

So we turn to the third of four broad approaches for mitigating violence and promoting peace – the *needs-based* approach. Unlike both power-based and rights-based strategies – which divide the parties into winners and losers based on who is strong or weak, or who is right or wrong – needs-based strategies go to the root of the issue by focusing on understanding the human needs that motivate each of the parties to a conflict, and on how all those human needs (including for security and justice, for respect and recognition) might be collaboratively addressed. Human needs are distinct from interests in that they are universally recognizable across cultures, not optional or negotiable, but an inherent feature of our humanity which generate stress if not addressed.¹⁹ Unlike rights (even human rights), which derive their legitimacy from some form of social consensus, whether divinely inspired or not, needs are empirical realities of the human condition, and as such provide common ground and a

¹⁹ Edward Azar “Protracted Social Conflicts and Second Track Diplomacy,” in Davies and Kaufman, 2003 (see footnote 4 page 5).

common language and empathy across political, religious and cultural divides.

Realism in conflict management requires more than an understanding of the sources of hard power; it also requires both an appreciation of the cultural norms and values of right and wrong which bind people into community, and also an understanding of the human needs which motivate these communities to act.

Even democratic governments can retain their legitimacy in the long term only to the extent they legislate and administer laws in ways that are responsive to the changing human needs of the people, including minorities, women and children. This is best accomplished through inclusive, needs-based processes, whether formal or informal, whereby the main stakeholders in any proposed reform are able to come together and achieve some level of consensus on how best to address their needs²⁰.

Conflicted or unstable societies typically lack mutually acceptable procedures for stakeholders to come together to resolve their disputes, especially where the government is not a neutral party. Governments may refuse to recognize the legitimacy of opposing stakeholders or their representatives, and their own legitimacy may also be challenged, based on power-based or rights-based considerations, leading to stalemate. Courts may be

²⁰ Harris and Reilly, 1998 (see footnote 14 page 14).

overwhelmed with cases, not trusted as honest brokers, or out of reach for poorer communities.

However, since a needs-based approach seeks a consensus in defining the conflict issues and the underlying needs to be addressed, it is possible to break a stalemate by bringing together informal representatives of the stakeholders, using the techniques of “second-track” or “citizens’ diplomacy.”²¹ These techniques can help to constructively empower members of civil society, as well as those in the public sector, including – depending on the issues – educators, police, judges, civil servants and religious, business, women, media or cultural opinion leaders, so that they can take responsibility for collaboratively identifying and addressing the issues in the absence of government action. Participants develop consensus agreements that they may be able to implement themselves, or which can be given to relevant policy makers or stakeholders to show them options for resolving or transforming the conflict in ways that would be acceptable to all stakeholders. They also develop skills for working together across party lines that will allow ongoing collaboration, providing powerful models for building an inclusive democratic culture of peace.

Our work in Lesotho, for example, brought together traditional leaders with appointed and elected officials at both local and national levels to reach consensus on steps for transitioning to elected local governance. Engaging

²¹ John Davies and Edward Kaufman *Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation*. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.

rather than marginalizing the chiefs in this process addressed their need for recognition, and helped to alleviate violence and to pave the way for a smooth democratic transition in that country²². Similarly, in Kashmir, we are helping to bring together local leaders from both sides of the line of control to discuss options for peacemaking; and we have periodically worked with Palestinian and Israeli partners to help build or revive peace processes²³.

I have argued elsewhere²⁴ that there is too big a gap between the normative logic of “power-based” autocratic political cultures, and the more complex normative logic of “rights-based” or democratic political cultures, for transitions to be straightforward. What is normative in one culture may be seen as threatening or unreasonable in the context of the other. The competitive structure of electoral politics or democratic political debate, for example, may appear uncivilized, divisive and disrespectful in a power-based political culture, creating unpredictability and threatening rather than serving the needs and interests of the people.

²² John Davies, Wubalem Fekade, ‘Mamphekeleli Hoohlo, Edy Kaufman and ‘Mamochaki Shale “Partners in Conflict in Lesotho: Building Capacity for Sustainable Peace.” In a forthcoming book edited by the Alliance for Peacebuilding, Washington DC.

²³ Edy Kaufman, Walid Salem and Juliette Verhoeven *Bridging the Divide: Peacebuilding in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

²⁴ John Davies “Power, Rights, Interests and Identity: Conflict Management Strategies for Building a Democratic Peace,” in Davies and Kaufman, 2003 (see footnote 4 page 5).

Needs-based approaches are well suited for bridging this gap, representing processes of intermediate complexity that provide experiences and models of constructive engagement that are essential for democratic transitions to take place smoothly²⁵. Beyond the transition period, they remain essential to the sustainability of democratic systems, providing integrative mechanisms to ensure continued legitimacy and effectiveness of government in addressing societal needs. Their importance is too often overlooked by governments, democratic reformers and revolutionaries alike.

The unprecedented success of peace processes in achieving negotiated settlements over the last 15 years reflects the fact that second-track diplomacy has now become a normal means of preparing the ground for formal negotiations, as well as an essential mechanism for monitoring and supporting the proper implementation of formal agreements, contributing to their sustainability, as well as that of new democracies emerging during this time.

Beyond working with stakeholders to identify and address their needs, second track (or multi-track) diplomacy techniques can be used to build, or recover, a national consensus on the values that define a shared national identity, that allow people to identify more strongly with the nation and accord legitimacy to laws and institutions that reflect those values. This builds social capital, the capacity and willingness of people to work

²⁵ Davies, 2003 (see footnote 4 page 5).

together for a common purpose even across different political, sectarian and regional divides. During the Lebanon war in the 1980's for example, our Center worked informally with the parties to help them find consensus on 20 principles that defined a Lebanon that Shia, Sunni, Christian and other Lebanese would all want to remain part of, and this became an important step toward the accords that ended the war²⁶.

In each case the key is inclusive, collaborative processes, whether formal or informal, which can enhance constructive public discussion and nonviolent civil activism within local cultural norms of democratic behavior, while at the same time providing insights to policy makers on which types of reform will have broad support and assuring all parties in both public and civil society sectors that they are respected as partners and do not need to resort to force. Government, police and judicial services play a critical role in democratic systems as legitimate protectors of public security and rule of law, in part by according safe public space for creative thinking and discussion of policy issues, ensuring stakeholders a secure participatory role in the process without fear of persecution.

Through such processes, clear models for inclusive democratic practice are provided, demonstrating how new laws can reflect the will of the people, and how working together for the common good can benefit all parties.

²⁶ Dylan Mathews *War Prevention Works: 50 Stories of People Resolving Conflict*. Oxford UK: Oxford Research Group, 2003.

Parties may discover, for example, that critical shortages of resources such as water can be managed in ways that address the needs of all parties, if it is done collaboratively, such as by sharing the latest irrigation technology to minimize waste, or charging more for “luxury” use. In the language of economics, it is human and social capital that allow us to creatively overcome the limitations implied by shortage of physical capital. Needs-based methods are essential tools for expanding social capital (the capacity and willingness to work together for mutual benefit) thus providing a key element for sustainable development and a culture of peace.

Unity-Based Approach

A fourth approach to alleviating violence is often overlooked, but may be equally essential for transforming societal conflict and building a culture of peace. *Unity-based* approaches emphasize that peace cannot be imposed from the outside: it has to be rooted in the direct experience of peace, so that peace is tasted as an immediate reality, not just an ideal for the future. This is an extension of the finding discussed above that sustainable peace and freedom are rarely achieved through violence, since the means contradicts the goal.

Each of the four approaches corresponds to a deeper and more inclusive layer of our identity, like the four layers of the heart. When identified with our body and those physically close to us, we are focused on using power to ensure our security in the external physical world. When identified with a shared culture and its norms and values of right and wrong, we are focused on being

righteous, in proper relationship with others, following the cultural rules and norms to ensure justice is served.

When identified with our shared humanity, we are focused on the human needs that are common to all of us, recognizing with humility aspects of ourselves as we come to know and help others outside our own community. And when identified with the unity and presence of all that is (*at tawhid*), peace is already our reality, shared with others even before we speak, because the world is no longer experienced as split into polarities of self and other, good and bad, giver and receiver, so there is no room for blame, jealousy or violence. This experience of unity, of being the peace, whether through *dhikr*, prayer or other means, provides inspiration and support for the other three approaches in proper balance.

For example, in northern Lesotho, there is a strong tradition of spiritual singing. During conflict management workshops we quickly developed an understanding that whenever the group became stressed or dispirited, one of the singers would stand and sing, and the rest of the group would soon be on their feet to join in, lifting and refreshing the heart so that the atmosphere in the room was radically energized and hopeful again, leading to productive agreements and follow-up implementation.²⁷ The impact of spiritual practices is well researched and may also go far beyond the limits of the room, helping to reduce violence and promote peacemaking on a macro scale, as we found consistently in our work during the

²⁷ Davies, Fekade, Hoohlo, Kaufman and Shale, forthcoming (see footnote 22 page 20).

Lebanon civil war in the 80's²⁸. Such practices may provide an essential basis for creating and sustaining a culture of peace.

²⁸ See John Davies and Charles Alexander "Alleviating Political Violence: Impact Assessment Analyses of the Lebanon War," *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 285-338 (2005), for an example of the broader impact unity-based approaches have had in alleviating violence and facilitating peacemaking efforts.

Book Review

Second Track / Citizens' Diplomacy

*Concepts and Techniques for
Conflict Transformation*

Edited by
John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman

At a time when the Arab region is facing growing internal and external threats to stability, there is need for an innovative approach to peace. *Second Track/Citizens' Diplomacy* serves this purpose, providing practical resources for strengthening a culture of peace and addressing the root causes of societal conflict through citizens' empowerment in cross-cultural dialogue, policy making and conflict transformation, among other topics. This book will help interested parties build skills that have proven highly effective in finding solutions to seemingly intractable challenges such as those now being faced in the Arab region. Translating this book into Arabic will help in guiding a much wider and more diverse audience to apply, adapt and disseminate these techniques and strengthen cultural norms for integrative approaches to conflict management and social change.

Almost all current wars are primarily intra-state, involving complex societal conflicts with at least one party a non-state community. In the absence of appropriate official mechanisms for talks acceptable to parties who challenge each other's legitimacy, second track or citizens' diplomacy provides facilitated dialogue to address conflict issues and underlying human needs, bringing together unofficial opinion leaders or equivalent representatives from communities in conflict to search for common ground and build support for official peace processes and/or local solutions as needed. It is an essential complement to official or first track diplomacy, often dovetailing with it in response to the enormous challenge that these complex conflicts pose to building a sustainable and dynamic peace.

In this volume, prominent contributors explain the development, theory and current practice of second track diplomacy. They examine the dynamics of modern complex conflicts, such as those in Sri Lanka, Israel/Palestine, Cyprus, or the Caucasus. Exploring innovative problem-solving methodologies, the book provides a detailed program for guiding "Partners in Conflict" in the search for common ground, and analyzes core issues that arise in practice and evaluation. This book will be valuable to academics, professionals involved in first or second track diplomacy, others interested in integrative methods of dispute resolution or conflict prevention, including those working in development, democratic reform, peacebuilding or humanitarian programs at any phase of the conflict cycle.

Davies and Kaufman examine the current state of the art in this unofficial, citizen-led approach to resolving disputes and transforming societal conflict into sustainable development. Their book provides a timely guide to current theory and practice. It is intended to provide a snapshot of the field of second track diplomacy and to serve as a resource for current and potential practitioners.

The editors have divided the book into four parts. It opens with four essays by pioneering authorities in the field – Edward Azar, Ted Robert Gurr and John Davies, John McDonald, and Ronald Fisher – that examine the dynamics of societal conflict and the shape and history of the field. A second section of four essays provides more details on the application of the processes analyzed in the

first section. These chapters include Herbert Kelman's examination of his ground breaking workshops in the Middle East; Davies' examination of seven strategies for managing conflict found across cultures, constituting a new model of political development; a guide for working across cultural divides by Christopher Moore and Peter Woodrow; and, an examination of lessons learned from the reconciliation process in South Africa by Eileen Borris.

Section three consists of two chapters by Kaufman which provide rich, practical guidelines for planning and facilitating conflict transformation workshops, including preparation, trust building, skills building, consensus building and action planning phases. The last section also has two chapters, one on training techniques by Andrea Strimling, the other, by Jay Rothman and Victor Friedman, addressing practical issues in planning and evaluating second-track diplomacy programs.

Current or intending practitioners will get the most out of this book, but it has much that can be used by others dealing with conflict within or between organizations or communities. The detailed descriptions of model workshops provided by Kaufman, Strimling, and Kelman will be useful sources of ideas to anyone trying to begin a dialogue between groups in conflict. Kelman's chapter is a clear, concise summary of his approach. Kaufman's two chapters present a more detailed step-by-step guide to innovative problem-solving workshops, presented as an optimal two-week program.

Other chapters add significantly to the book's utility as a "how-to" guide. Moore and Woodrow's framework for mapping cultures will be helpful to all, essential for those with less cross-cultural experience. Rothman and Friedman describe an action evaluation approach often used to evaluate conflict management projects while also facilitating capacity to adapt to new challenges. Their chapter should be regarded as a practical first step and it will be important to anyone seeking funding for such work.

Editors' Biographies

John Davies is Co-Director of the Partners in Conflict and Partners in Peacebuilding Projects, and Senior Faculty Associate with the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), Department of Government and Politics, at the University of Maryland. He has LL.B., M.Litt., M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in law, psychology and political psychology/international conflict management from the Australian National University, the University of New England and Maharishi International University. In addition to law practice, he has held research and teaching positions at Harvard University, the University of Spiritual Healing and Sufism, and at the University of New England and Murdoch University in Australia, joining the University of Maryland in 1988.

Working with CIDCM since 1988, Dr. Davies has led conflict transformation initiatives and workshops bringing together conflicting parties in over 20 countries on 6 continents, including in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South, East and South East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North and South America. He has trained thousands of government, IO and CSO professionals in conflict transformation, prevention, peacebuilding and democratic transitions, including political leaders, diplomats, negotiators peacekeepers and senior police. He is widely published and serves as consultant to the US Government's State Failure, Political Instability and Genocide Early Warning Projects, US Agency for International Development and the US Department of State and Department of Defense; and the

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He is a Senior Specialist both with the Fulbright Program and Department of State; has served as Visiting Fellow at universities in India, Pakistan and the Philippines; and as trustee and board member for the London-based Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), and the US-based Shadhiliyya Sufi Center. He is a frequent featured speaker in the US and overseas, with recent appearances on NPR, BBC and VOA.

Edward Kaufman also co-directs (with Prof. Davies) the Partners in Conflict and Partners in Peacebuilding Projects at CIDCM, University of Maryland, and has served both as Director of CIDCM (1991-1996) and as Executive Director of the Truman Institute for Peace at Hebrew University in Jerusalem (1983-2004). He has BA and MA degrees in Political Science, International Relations and Sociology from Hebrew University, received his doctorate in International Relations at the Sorbonne, and did postgraduate work in the United States, where he has also taught widely.

Dr. Kaufman's work has focused on applied research, teaching and training of conflict resolution and human rights in the Middle East, Latin America and worldwide. He has authored 11 books and many articles on these topics, several of them co-authored with Palestinian and Muslim colleagues. He has been instrumental in focusing the work of the Truman Institute on joint research projects with Palestinian academics, and has helped to introduce conflict resolution as a discipline to the Hebrew University and to Israel and the Middle East in general. At

the global level, he has served for many years as a member of the International Executive Committee of the Nobel Peace Laureate, Amnesty International as well as the Committee for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, and continues to serve on the Advisory Board of Human Rights Watch/Middle East. Within Israel he served as Honorary Secretary of the Council for Jews in Arab Countries and is the outgoing Chair of the Carter-Merill Human Rights Award winning organization B'tselem. His current research and advocacy interests are in merging the paradigms of human rights and conflict resolution.

صناعة الحرب وثقافة السلام

**The Craft of War
and the Culture of Peace**

حروب ينتصر فيها الجميع

Win-Win Wars

Dr. Kadry Hefny

Background Paper No. 2

Abstract

The Craft of War and the Culture of Peace

Studies have revealed that the success of a product in the market, does not only depend on announcing its existence and displaying its features, but also depends on establishing a culture that supports the product and guarantees a constant need for it. This is true in the tourism, the movie, the plastic surgery and the weapon industries.

The weapon industry is one of the largest industries and one of the most profitable worldwide. It would be natural that this industry is supported by a culture that promotes and advocates war. This culture, that promotes violence has presented itself through thousands of movies, books, poems and studies that revolve around idealizing violence and considering it the only way to maintain dignity, respect and rights.

The culture of violence has spread to an extent that now, nations strive to acquire weapons even if they do not intend going to war. These nations use weapon acquisition to dissuade other countries from considering attacks. This culture has ensured that the weapons industry thrives under all circumstances, and as soon as war breaks out, the industry reaches its peak along with other illegal activities such as smuggling and black market. War also is the right environment that encourages these activities to grow and produces a great opportunity for corruption.

In the book *No-Nonsense Guide to Arms Trade* Gideon Burrows used the phrase "The Dirty Dozen" to refer to leading countries in the field of arms trade where the United States holds the lead, followed by Russia, France, England, Germany and Holland. These six countries account for eighty five percent of global weapon exports, Israel being the twelfth on that list. Ironically the first four countries on the list are permanent members of the Security Council, responsible for maintaining "Global Peace".

In the light of this analogy, the continuous opposition toward the culture of peace can be understood. It is a culture, which is not backed up by an industry that supports it, and in this respect it is similar to cultures such as environment friendly industries versus industries which are not environmentally oriented.

صناعة الحرب وثقافة السلام*

تؤكد دراسات علم النفس الإعلامي أن رواج سلعة معينة لا يتوقف على مجرد الإعلان عن وجودها وعرض مزاياها بل أن الرواج الأمثل إنما يتحقق بقيام ثقافة مساندة للسلعة تضمن لها دوام وتضاعف الطلب عليها. ويتطلب خلق مثل تلك الثقافة تشكيلا لخريطة الوعي بما تتضمنه من معايير وقيم واتجاهات بحيث يصبح الطلب على تلك السلعة جزءا لا يتجزأ من نسيج تلك الثقافة. يصدق ذلك على صناعة السياحة بقدر صدقه على صناعة السينما وجراحات التجميل وكذلك الأسلحة.

ولعلنا لا نضيف حديثاً إذا ما ذكرنا أن صناعة السلاح تُعد من أضخم مجالات الصناعة وأكثرها ربحية، ولذلك فمن الطبيعي أن تسعى تلك الصناعة لدعم الثقافة التي تساندها وتساعد على ترويجها، وأن تجند لنشر تلك الثقافة أي ثقافة الحرب تراثا ضخما من مختلف العلوم الإنسانية على رأسها الإعلام وعلم النفس بل والتاريخ أحيانا. وهكذا شهدنا عبر سنوات طوال آلاف الأفلام والكتب ودواوين الشعر، بل والدراسات "العلمية" التي تصب جميعا في تقديس العنف واعتباره جوهر الطبيعة الإنسانية والسبيل الأوحى للحصول على الكرامة والاحترام والحفاظ على الحقوق.

* نشرت بجريدة الأهرام يوم الخميس ٧ سبتمبر ٢٠٠٦

لقد ازدهرت تلك الثقافة وضربت بجذورها في كافة نواحي الحياة بحيث لم يعد أمام الدول والجماعات مهرب من غواية الحصول على الأسلحة حتى لو لم تكن تخطط لقتال، فعليها دوما تكديس الأسلحة لكي لا تغري أحد بالاعتداء عليها، وبحيث تستمر تجارة السلاح في الازدهار تحت كافة الظروف. وما أن تشتعل الحرب حتى يبلغ ذلك الازدهار أوجه ولا يقتصر تدفق الأرباح آنذاك على منتجي السلاح فحسب بل يشمل العديد من المهريين وتجار السوق السوداء وغيرهم، ومما يدعم ذلك أن مناخ الحرب بما يفرضه من سرية -خاصة فيما يتعلق بصفقات الأسلحة وعمولاتها- يشجع استثناء الفساد دون رقابة أو خوف من افتضاح، بعكس ما ينبغي أن يفرضه مناخ السلام من شفافية تتيح على الأقل فضح الفاسدين والمرتشين، ولعلنا ما زلنا نذكر تعبيراً شاع بيننا خلال فترة الحرب العالمية الثانية عن "أغنياء الحرب" أي أولئك الذين ظهرت عليهم مظاهر الثراء فجأة بفضل مناخ الحرب والسوق السوداء، غير أن "أغنياء الحرب" هؤلاء لا يحتلون سوى ذيل قائمة أغنياء الحرب الحقيقية.

لقد أصدر الصحفي البريطاني جدوين باروز عام ٢٠٠٢ كتاباً بعنوان "صناعة السلاح" استخدم فيه تعبير "المجموعة القذرة" مشيراً إلى قائمة الدول التي تصدر صناعة السلاح وترتبع الولايات المتحدة على رأسها، تليها روسيا، ثم فرنسا، ثم بريطانيا، وألمانيا، ثم هولندا، حيث تستأثر تلك الدول الست بتصدير ٨٥% من السلاح في العالم وتحتل إسرائيل المرتبة الثانية عشرة في تلك القائمة، ومن المثير للانتباه أن الدول الأربعة التي تصدر تلك القائمة أعضاء دائمين في مجلس الأمن وهو المجلس المسئول عن "السلام العالمي".

نستطيع في ضوء ما تقدم أن نفهم مصدر تلك المقاومة الشرسة التي تثيرها الدعوة لثقافة السلام، فهي في النهاية مجرد ثقافة لا تستند إلى صناعة تدعمها وترعاها، شأنها في ذلك شأن ثقافة الطب الوقائي في مقابل صناعة الأدوية، وثقافة حماية البيئة في مقابل الصناعات الملوثة للبيئة.

لقد استخدم جدوين باروز في كتابه تعبير "المجموعة القذرة"، وغني عن البيان أنه لا يقصد بطبيعة الحال شعوب هذه الدول، فهو شخصياً ناشط بريطاني في حقل المنظمات غير الحكومية المعارضة لهذا النوع من التجارة، وغيره العديد في كافة أنحاء العالم يدعمون ويمولون بل ويقدمون أرواحهم أحياناً دفاعاً عن تلك الثقافة، ولعل بعضنا ما زال يذكر المناضلة الأمريكية اليهودية داعية السلام راشيل كوري، البالغة من العمر ٢٣ عاماً والتي سحقتها جرافة إسرائيلية خلال احتجاجها على الممارسات الإسرائيلية في رفح مارس ٢٠٠٣.

صحيح أن مجموع أعداد الناشطين في مجال ثقافة السلام في العالم لا يمكن أن يقارن بأعداد العاملين في أجهزة القتال والأمن في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وحدها مثلاً، وصحيح كذلك أن تمويل أنشطة السلام بل وحتى أنشطة التعليم والرعاية الصحية لا يمكن أن يقارن بتلك المليارات التي تنفق على صناعة وتجارة السلاح، وصحيح كذلك أن الدعوة لثقافة السلام تتعرض دوماً لمحاولات التزييف والتهجم ووصمها بأنها ليست سوى دعوة لاستسلام المظلوم للظالم، وأنها نقيض لثقافة المقاومة، ورغم كل ذلك فإن ثقافة السلام ما زالت

رغم كل شيء تحاول الاستمرار في الحياة مستندة إلى تزايد الدمار الذي تحدثه تكنولوجيا الأسلحة المتطورة، وما تنذر به أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأكثر تطورا، وما يؤدي إليه ذلك من تزايد وعي من يدفعون بالفعل ثمن الحرب ويتحملون خسائرها ودمارها.

ثري هل يمكن أن تربي الأجيال القادمة تصاعد وعي المقهورين والمظلومين وضحايا الحروب بإمكانيات وجدوى النضال السلمي والكفاح المدني، في مقابل ذلك الثمن الباهظ والنتائج غير الحاسمة للاعتماد على السلاح.

Abstract

Win-Win Wars

We recently witnessed the bloody conflicts between the Israeli Army, backed by the Israeli government, and the people and government of Lebanon supported by Hezbollah and their fighters. The conflict ended with the Security Council issuing the 1701 cease fire decree.

Both parties accepted and were eager to sign the decree, and were committed to abide by its statements. Each party considered this as an evidence of its victory. Hezbollah focused on how they disrupted the Israeli army image and the amount of casualties. On the other hand Israel focused on its destruction of the south of Lebanon and its penetration of that area with Hezbollah accepting this fact. How can the announcement of victory from both sides be explained? Is there a war in which everyone wins?

In other cases humanity witnessed wars in which one party usually is victorious. This was evident in World Wars I and II and in the 1948 and 1967 wars.

Political psychology and negotiation may explain this phenomenon, where the term "win-win" is often used to express a situation in which both parties come out with a gain.

Both parties are convinced that what is achieved on the battle field is a conquest without any need to go through

another war unless the other party shows hostility. From this point conflict can be resolved.

Hence it is possible that this could have happened after the victory of the October war.

The post Lebanon 2006 war was different from the post Sinai 1973 war. The most important aspect is the cultural and religious diversity in Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the consequential relationships with Iran and Syria.

The question here is: Are we facing a settlement based on a win-win policy or are we at the brink of a new conflict or a Lebanese civil war?

حروب ينتصر فيها الجميع*

شهدنا مؤخراً مواجهات دامية بين الجيش الإسرائيلي ومن خلفه حكومة إسرائيل، ولبنان حكومة وشعباً وفي المقدمة حزب الله ومقاتليه، وفي خلفية تلك المواجهات تقف مصالح الولايات المتحدة وإيران فضلاً عن سوريا، وصدر في النهاية قرار مجلس الأمن رقم ١٧٠١ الذي يقضي بتوقف القتال.

والملفت للنظر أن الطرفين المتقاتلين أبديا قبولهما بل وحماستها بصدور القرار والتزامهما بتنفيذه باعتباره معبراً عن "انتصارهما"، رغم بعض التحفظات من الجانبين، وراح كل طرف يسوق أدلة انتصاره، معتمداً على آلية يعرفها المشتغلون بعلم النفس السياسي تكفل عدم التورط في كذب صريح أو اختلاق مفضوح، وذلك بالتهويل من وقائع بعينها والتهوين من وقائع أخرى ثم الربط بين كل ذلك ليصبح في مقدور كل طرف أن ينسب لنفسه الانتصار.

ركز حزب الله على حقيقة اهتزاز هيبة الجيش الأسطوري الإسرائيلي، وسقوط جنوده و تدمير دباباته، وعجز "ذراع الطويلة" عن كفالة الأمن لمواطنيه الذين عرفوا للمرة الأولى معنى ضحايا قصف البيوت بالصواريخ، واللجوء للملاجئ، وإخلاء المنازل من سكانها للعيش في مخيمات إيواء مؤقتة.

* نشرت بجريدة الأهرام يوم الخميس ٢٤ أغسطس ٢٠٠٦

وركزت إسرائيل على أنها دمرت الجنوب اللبناني وهو المجال البشري الرئيسي لتواجد حزب الله، وأن قواتها البرية قد اخترقت بالفعل العمق اللبناني، وأن حزب الله قد قبل بانتشار الجيش اللبناني والقوات الدولية في الجنوب وهو ما كان يرفضه باستمرار.

لقد شهدت البشرية ما لا حصر له من الحروب التي كانت تنتهي عادةً بانتصار يحققه طرف على حساب هزيمة تلحق بالطرف الآخر، بحيث تكون الهزيمة واضحة لا يملك الطرف المهزوم إنكارها، والنصر واضحاً لا يحتاج إثبات. هكذا كانت نهاية الحربين العالميتين الأولى والثانية وكذلك كانت نهاية حروبنا عام ٤٨ و عام ٦٧.

تُرى كيف يمكن أن نفسر إعلان انتصار الجانبين؟ هل ثمة حرب ينتصر فيها الجميع؟

لعلنا نستطيع أن نلتمس تفسيراً في تراث علم النفس السياسي وخاصة لدى من يعملون في مجال التفاوض، حيث يشيع تعبير "مكسب-مكسب"، ويقصد به إدارة الصراع بحيث ينتهي إلى تفاوض يحقق مكسباً للطرفين المتصارعين.

وتتطلب تلك الآلية إدارة الصراع بحيث يقدم أطراف الصراع على مواجهة يتم إنهاؤها دون أن ينجح طرف في إلحاق هزيمة كاملة بالطرف

الأخر، ومن خلال آلية الانتقاء والتضخيم، يصبح كل طرف على قناعة بأن ما أنجزه على أرض المعركة يعني أنه حقق انتصاراً وأنه ليس في حاجة لحرب جديدة إلا إذا اعتدى عليه الطرف الآخر، ومن ثم يصبح ممكناً التدخل لإحراز تسوية من خلال مفاوضات تتضمن قدراً من المكاسب والتنازلات من الطرفين، دون خوف من اتهام أي منهما بالهزيمة والاستسلام.

لعل شيئاً من ذلك قد حدث -مع الفارق الكبير- بعد إحراز انتصار أكتوبر حيث نازعتنا إسرائيل إعلان الانتصار، وقامت المعالجة الإعلامية الإسرائيلية آنذاك على نفس آلية الانتقاء والتضخيم لعدد من الحقائق والتجاهل والتهوين من حقائق أخرى:

التركيز على الاختراق الذي قام به الجيش الإسرائيلي عابراً قناة السويس فيما عرف بالثغرة والتي ركز الإعلام الإسرائيلي خلالها على نشر صورة العلم الإسرائيلي يرفرف على الضفة الغربية للقناة، وجولدا مائير تصافح جنودها تحت العلم، وتصدر قراراً بتعيين حاكم عسكري للمنطقة؛ وكذلك التركيز على موقع تلك الخيمة الشهيرة عند الكيلو ١٠١ حيث جرت أولى محادثات فك الاشتباك، وإبراز أن تلك المحادثات جرت على أرض مصرية تبعد عن العاصمة بـ ١٠١ كيلومتر فقط، ومن ثم استخلاص أن النصر النهائي كان لهم، والتهوين بالمقابل من دلالة انكسار هيبة الجيش الأسطوري الإسرائيلي بعبور القوات المصرية إلى الضفة الشرقية ورفع العلم المصري على بقايا خط

بارليف وعدم التركيز على صور الجنود والضباط الإسرائيليين الأسرى
ودباياهم المخطمة، وقبول إسرائيل مبدئياً بالانسحاب من سيناء.

على هذا الأساس أمكن جلوس الطرفين المتقاتلين على مائدة المفاوضات و
التوصل إلى تسوية ما زالت صامدة رغم كل شيء طيلة ٣٣ عاماً.

ثمة اختلافات عميقة بين ما شهدته سيناء ١٩٧٣ وما تشهده لبنان
٢٠٠٦، لعل أهم تلك الاختلافات تتمثل في تلك التركيبة الطائفية اللبنانية،
والطابع العقائدي الديني لحزب الله وما يترتب على ذلك الطابع من علاقات
متشابكة مع إيران و سوريا، وكذلك حرص الولايات المتحدة على إدراج ما
يجري ضمن حملتها للقضاء على الإرهاب.

ولكن تُرى هل لنا أن نتساءل رغم تلك الاختلافات عن احتمالات
تشابه مآل الأحداث في الحالتين؟ أترانا على أبواب تسوية يجري الإعداد لها في
الكواليس وفقاً لقاعدة الكل رابح؟ أم أن التاريخ لن يعيد نفسه، ومن ثم فقد
نشهد مواجهة جديدة؟ أو حرباً أهلية لبنانية؟

الأحداث ما زالت تتوالى، والصورة النهائية لم تتضح بعد، ولكن الأمور
لا يمكن بحال أن تعود إلى ما كانت عليه قبل المواجهة.

**Conflict Transformation and
a Culture of Peace
in the Arab Countries**

13-14 September 2006

Agenda

Day 1: Wednesday, 13 September 2006

10:00–13:30 First session

Chairperson: **Dr. Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat**

"The current situation in the region"

- 10:00–11:00 Presentations
- 11:00–11:15 Coffee break
- 11:15–13:00 Open discussions
- 13:00–13:30 Session summary

13:30–15:00 Lunch (Hilton Coffee Shop)

15:00–18:30 Second session

Chairperson: **Ambassador Wafaa Bassim**

"The dynamics of societal conflict transformation"

- 15:00–16:00 Presentations
- 16:00–16:15 Coffee break
- 16:15–18:00 Open discussions
- 18:00–18:30 Session summary

Day 2: Thursday, 14 September 2006

10:00–13:30 Third session

Chairperson: **Dr. Hisham El-Sherif**

"Exploring what a culture of peace in the region may look like"

- 10:00–11:00 Presentations
- 11:00–11:15 Coffee break
- 11:15–13:00 Open discussions
- 13:00–13:30 Session summary

13:30–15:00 Lunch (Hilton Coffee Shop)

15:00–18:30 Fourth session

Chairperson: **Ms. Lamiaa El-Ayoubi**

"How can such a culture of peace be promoted?"

- 15:00–16:00 Presentations
- 16:00–16:15 Coffee break
- 16:15–18:00 Open discussions
- 18:00–18:30 Session summary

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